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Abstract
Chinese higher education policy has followed a fluctuating 
path determined by the twists and turns in the politics of 
the post-1949 Chinese state and that was particularly the 
case in the pre-reform era (1950s-1970s). This article, 
through investigating the changes of leadership that 
have occurred in Chinese universities and the duties of 
university administrators, examines the zigzag course 
which Chinese higher education policy has followed, 
identifying the model that shaped China’s higher education 
during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. It also 
looks at what changes have taken place in China’s higher 
education since the 1980s, putting the pre-reform model 
in a broader context of China’s educational development. 
The article argues that the post-reform model for China’s 
higher education has functioned primarily in setting 
the political limits for the professional and commercial 
development of higher education in the course of China’s 
market-oriented reforms. In comparison with this political 
boundary-based model, the Chinese higher educational 
model during the period from the 1950s to 1980s could 
be identified as a management-oriented model. Not only 
did it set political limits but it also played an active role in 
informing the important managerial practices involved in 
the operation of Chinese universities. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ascent to 
power in 1949, Chinese higher education policy has 
followed a fluctuating path determined by the twists 
and turns in the politics of the post-1949 Chinese state. 
The dominance of one or other path in higher education 
has been the result of a continuous tension between two 
political lines within the CCP and changes in the relative 
strength or weakness of these political lines have entailed 
shifts between two higher education programs. 
As we shall see, these shifts were particularly the case 
in China’s higher education in the pre-reform era though 
the higher education system as a whole was “subject to 
highly centralised decision-making and detailed resource 
allocation and administration” (Qiang, 2012, p.46) during 
that time. This article, through investigating the changes 
of leadership that have occurred in Chinese universities 
and the duties of university administrators, examines the 
zigzag course which Chinese higher education policy 
has followed; identifying the model that shaped China’s 
higher education during the period from the 1950s to the 
1980s. It also highlights important themes that are relevant 
to our understanding of higher education in China today. 
As education is essentially conditioned by ideology 
and the political system of a country, the article starts 
with a brief discussion of the dominant ideology in China. 
Ideology, however, is a complex issue. The following 
discussion only aims to explore some of the basic features 
of ideology in China in a general sense in order to provide 
an insight into the ideological sources for the model of 
Chinese higher education during the period from the 
1950s to the 1980s. 
Ideology is “a complex term describing the body of 
doctrine, myth, and symbols shared by a social movement, 
institution, class, or group” (Tardif & Atkinson, et al., 
1988, p.174). In other words ideology is a set of beliefs, 
attitudes and values which, combined together, provides 
a world view and a prism through which action is shaped. 
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“Ideology” is a very popular word in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and plays a fundamental role in 
all facets of the society. While claiming to be proletarian 
and “fundamentally different from the ideologies of 
all the exploiting classes ...” (The Editorial Board for 
Philosophy of the General Editorial Board of the Chinese 
Encyclopaedia, 1987, p.1098), the dominant ideology in 
post-1949 China arguably consists of two sets of beliefs. 
One can be called the “pure” ideology which is 
inherent in the dogma of the CCP. This set of beliefs gives 
individuals a unified, theoretical and, most importantly, 
an authoritative sense of the political order and priorities 
which obtain within PRC society. Pure ideology can 
be summarized as emphasizing the socialist road, the 
absolute leadership of the CCP, and loyalty of the Chinese 
people to the Party itself. Another set of beliefs is rooted 
in the “practical” ideology of modern China. This 
corresponds basically to what is taken to be the people’s 
original, common and natural beliefs in the development 
of the economy, economic growth, the improvement of 
living standards and national strength and prosperity. 
A combination of both forms of ideology may be 
expressed in the well-known slogan to uphold both 
“redness” and “expertise” which was first formulated by 
Mao Zedong in 1957 (Mao, 1977b, p.471). According to 
the CCP, “redness” denotes a firm political orientation 
and adherence to the Four Basic Principles which 
are adherence to the socialist road, the proletarian 
dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism, 
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (Deng, 1994a, 
pp.164-165); “expertise”, on the other hand, consists of 
practical expertise on the job and the study and mastery of 
technical or professional knowledge for the construction 
and modernisation of the nation (The Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987a, p.182).
As pure ideology, or “redness”, stems from the official 
ruling body’s belief in its historical mission and demands a 
political commitment which makes any unofficial political 
and ideological analysis impossible, and it consequently 
equates the will of the ruling party with that of the people, 
we can probably rename it as the single official ideology. 
Since the founding of the PRC, this single official 
ideology has always been in the dominant position in the 
development of China’s higher education. This can be best 
seen by examining the rigid framework which confines 
policy fluctuations within higher education in China.
1.  THE FRAMEWORK
The framework which characterises the CCP’s educational 
policy was in fact sketched out before the CCP came 
to power. The “General Policy on Soviet Cultural 
Education”, advanced by Mao Zedong in January 1934 
in the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area, is an example of 
this framework. This basic policy stressed the use the 
communist spirit to educate the laboring masses as well 
as ensuring that cultural education should serve the 
revolutionary war and class struggle and that education 
was combined with labour (The Editorial Board for 
Education of the Chinese Encyclopaedia’s General 
Editorial Board, 1985, p.529). The key points in this 
policy were the use the CCP’s ideology to educate people 
and the imperative for education to serve politics and 
political ideology. 
In post-1949 China, this framework was given legal 
force and became the distinguishing feature of the CCP’s 
national educational policy. The following quotation from 
CCP policy reveals the basic features of this framework:
The education policy of the Party is that education serves 
proletarian politics and education combines with production 
and labour. In order to implement this policy, education must be 
led by the Party ... . In a communist society, the new men who 
develop in an all-round way are those who have both political 
consciousness and culture, and are able to undertake both mental 
and manual labour, …(The Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party & The State Council, 1958). 
In the light of this quote, the educational framework 
can be summarised as follows: education in China must 
be led by the CCP and must serve both the socialist 
revolution and socialist reconstruction and the product of 
education must be both “red” and expert.
During the period of the 1950s through to the 1980s, 
the development of Chinese education was restricted 
within this framework. If some aspects of this framework 
appear less ideological in nature than those enunciated 
in 1934, this is probably because the earlier policy was 
established by the CCP when it did not have national 
power and when its basic tasks did not include national 
economic reconstruction. Having said this, however, it 
is clear that key elements of the framework have been 
maintained consistently from before the CCP came to 
power in 1949 through to the 1980s and even up to today. 
2.  TWO SUB-MODELS THEORY
As stated earlier, tensions between two political lines in 
the CCP and their relative strength or weakness at different 
times during the early decades of the PRC resulted in 
shifts between two higher education programs during 
that period. Theodore Hsi-en Chen has demonstrated the 
key features of these two programs in what he termed 
“The Academic Model” and “The Revolutionary Model” 
(hereafter referred as sub-models. Re-terming Chen’s two 
models is for distinguishing them from the model, as this 
article identifies, that shaped China’s higher education 
during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s). “In 
regard to the Red-expert dichotomy”, wrote Chen, “the 
academic model focuses on the production of experts with 
acceptable “Redness” while the revolutionary model gives 
priority to political-ideological Redness but does not shut 
out the development of expertise” (Chen, 1981, p.7). 
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In this description, no antagonistic contradiction seems 
to exist between these two sub-models. I say so because 
in post-1949 China, an antagonistic contradiction is 
considered to be one which is created from the conflict 
between the interests of the classes “which favour, 
support and participate in the socialist construction” and 
those which “are hostile to and sabotage the socialist 
construction” (Mao, 1977a, p.364).
Looking at the supporters of these two sub-models, 
it can be seen that both adhere to the value of “redness”. 
Therefore they represent no contradiction in ideological 
objectives and class interests. The difference between the 
two sub-models is only that one stresses the development 
of expertise more than the other. The following Table 
1 from Theodore Hsi-en Chen’s book headed further 
illustrates this point: 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Contrasting Models
Revolutionary model (1966-1976) Academic model (since 1976)
National goals Primary emphasis on revolution and Communism, with attention to production and development.
Primary emphasis on development and modernization, 
with attention to politics and ideology.
Desired product 
The zealous revolutionary; the unswerving ideologue 
and activist. Redness more crucial than expertness. 
Indigenous experts, barefoot professionals.
Trained personnel  with  ski l ls  and technical 
competence. Trained experts and scholars committed 
to the proletarian cause and ideology. 
Leadership
The Communist Party, the worker-peasant- soldier 
teachers and administrators of schools. Intellectuals 
downgraded.
Active role of professionals-teachers, educator-under 
Party leadership.
… … …
Ideological framework 
Maoism. Literal acceptance of the quotes, instructions, 
directives, etc. Rigid adherence to Party lines, 
narrowly conceived.
Liberal concept of the Thought of Mao. His teachings 
interpreted to meet current conditions. Emancipation 
of mind from hardened dogmas (Chen, 1981, p.222).
The sub-model that was dominant from 1966 to 1976 
(the period of the Cultural Revolution) is undoubtedly 
the most extreme example of the Revolutionary Model. 
The sub-model that has come into force since 1976 
may be regarded as the most extreme example of the 
Academic Model. 
The reason for this is that an historic change in 
policies which was described as “a great turn with the 
profoundest significance in the CCP’s history since the 
foundation of the People’s Republic of China” (Ma & 
Chen, 1991, p.428) took place in the 3rd Plenary Session 
of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1978. This 
great turn can perhaps be generalised as a turn from 
an extreme revolutionary period to a period with great 
emphasis on construction. 
Tha t  the  per iod  1966-1976  was  an  ex t reme 
revolutionary period is unlikely to be questioned. What 
needs to be discussed is why the period since 1978 can be 
called a period with great emphasis on construction. Two 
decisions that have historic significance were made by the 
CCP in its 3rd Plenary Session in 1978. These decisions 
were: (a) to cease using the slogan “take class struggle as 
the key link” (yi jieji douzheng weigang), and (b) to shift 
the work stress of the whole Party to the construction of 
socialist modernisation (The Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, p.327). Class struggle, 
which had been such a core element of CCP ideology and 
integral to the maintenance of the political leadership of 
the Party, was now to be de-emphasised―this was truly 
a profound shift and, in my opinion, demonstrates the 
unprecedented importance given to construction during 
this period. 
For contrast we can look at an earlier situation where 
a similar, but ultimately less all-encompassing, decision 
to shift the emphasis in Party work to construction was 
made. The period 1956-66 was called “the ten years of 
starting the construction of socialism in an all-round way” 
(kaishi quanmian jianshe shehuizhuyi de shinian) (The 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
1987b, p.309). At the 8th National Congress of the CCP 
held in September 1956, it was stated that “the main task 
of the people throughout the country is to concentrate all 
strength on the development of social production forces, 
and realise the nation’s industrialisation ...” (The Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, 
p.308). In 1958, Mao Zedong further argued for China 
to shift the work emphasis of the Party and the nation to 
technical revolution and socialist construction (The Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, 
p.309). Class struggle, however, was also still emphasised 
during that period. In 1957 the CCP launched the Anti-
Rightist Campaign and enlarged this struggle to include 
many intellectuals, patriotic personages and party cadres. 
More importantly, Mao Zedong, after this campaign, said 
that the contradiction between the proletarian class and 
the capitalist class was still the principal contradiction in 
Chinese society (The Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, 1987b, p.313), and this view was 
further developed by Mao Zedong at the 10th Plenary 
Session of the 8th Central Committee held in September 
1962 (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 1987b, pp.312-313). 
It is understood that different attitudes towards class 
struggle can actually demonstrate different attitudes 
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towards construction. Therefore, ultimately, the period 
1956-66 cannot be called a period with great emphasis 
on construction, compared with the period from 1978 
onwards when the CCP stopped the use of the slogan “take 
class struggle as the key link”. The period after 1978 is the 
only time the CCP attempted to both shift the work stress 
to construction and relax the emphasis on class struggle. 
These two important decisions not only “show that the 
CCP has essentially smashed the long-term heavy bonds 
of the “Left” deviation” (Ma & Chen, 1991, p.428) but 
are also evidence that the period from 1978 is the most 
extreme example of an emphasis on construction since the 
founding of the People’s Republic. 
We can conclude that, as any fundamental change in 
the CCP’s policies would affect education, the historic 
change in the CCP’s policies which occurred in 1978 and 
which was characterised by the turn from a revolutionary 
direction to a constructive direction, would inevitably 
cause a corresponding change in educational priorities. 
Logically this would entail a turn from the most extreme 
example of the Revolutionary Model to the most extreme 
example of the Academic Model. 
Let us now look at these two extreme examples. They 
should not be understood as two mutually exclusive 
sub-models. The Academic Model still includes politics 
and ideology―the single official ideology―and the 
Revolutionary Model does not completely ignore 
production and development. Based on this and also on 
the basis of the coexistence of both pure and practical 
forms of ideology in China, it can be argued that the major 
issue that these two sub-models have struggled with is, 
in fact, the relation between “redness” and expertise, i.e., 
whether “redness” or expertise should be emphasised in a 
practical situation. 
Both sub-models insist on “redness” and “expertise”, 
simply because maintaining both “redness” and 
“expertise”, as the framework requires, limits any possible 
major shift in higher education. The 1992 Constitution 
of the CCP clearly illustrates this. In a period when the 
extreme example of the Academic Model is in a dominant 
position, the Constitution emphasises that “it is imperative 
to take economic construction as the centre of the work, ...” 
but that “in the whole process of the socialist construction 
of modernisations, we must adhere to the Four Basic 
Principles and oppose bourgeois liberalisation” (The 
Chinese Communist Party, 1992, p.1). This is because the 
Four Basic Principles (as a reflection of “redness”) “will 
provide a political guarantee and guiding direction for the 
socialist construction of modernisation” (Qiao & Zhai, 
1991, p.402).
3 .   L E A D E R S H I P  I N  C H I N E S E 
UNIVERSITIES
Leadership in universities is an important aspect of 
the different sub-models of higher education described 
above and changes in the leadership system are also a 
direct result of the zigzag course which Chinese higher 
education policy has followed. The following, which is 
based on Chinese books published in the 1980s (Wang 
& Ying, 1983a, pp.226-230; Liu & Li, 1986, pp.1-9), is a 
brief introduction to the changes of leadership that have 
occurred in Chinese universities since 1949. 
I. The president responsibility system (1950-1956) 
(Xiaozhang fuze zhi). In this system, the presidents 
of universities exercised leadership in all academic 
and administrative management and were responsible 
directly to the Party and the State. At that time the Party 
organisation in a university played a key role only in 
political affairs; this included, for example, supervising 
ideological remolding and other political movements. 
II. The university council responsibility system 
under the leadership of the Party Committee (1956-
1960) (Dangwei lingdao xia de xiaowu weiyuanhui fuze 
zhi). In this system, the university council was an organ 
of power directed by the president, but controlled by the 
Party Committee. All the important issues were discussed 
in the Council, but the power of decision-making was 
held by the Party Committee. The president was only 
responsible for implementation of decisions made by the 
Party Committee.
III. The university council responsibility system 
(with the president as the dominant factor) under 
the leadership of the Party Committee (1961-1966) 
(Dangwei lingdao xia de yi xiaozhang weishou de xiaowu 
weiyuanhui fuze zhi). In this system, even though the 
supreme power was still held by the Party Committee, the 
University Council, particularly the president, could play 
a more important role in management than in the past.
IV. The centralised Party leadership system (1966-
1978). This system was created in a very unusual period, 
the Cultural Revolution. In this system, the Revolutionary 
Committee was the organ of power under the leadership of 
the Party Committee. The Party Committee was involved 
in all aspects of university life.
V. The president (the president and the vice-
presidents) sharing the responsibilities system and 
(since the 1980s) the president responsibility system 
under the leadership of the Party Committee (Dangwei 
lingdao xia de xiaozhang fengong fuze zhi and Dangwei 
lingdao xia de xiaozhang fuze zhi) (legalised in Higher 
Education Law which took effect in 1999). In this 
system, the president took charge of the university’s 
routine work with vice-presidents helping the president 
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to supervise teaching, research and administration. 
However, all the important issues in the teaching, 
research and administrative areas had to be discussed in 
the Party Committee, and decisions were made by the 
Party Committee. The president was responsible for the 
implementation of those decisions. In “A Program for the 
Reform and Development of Chinese Education” (1993), 
Item 38, the principle of this system was restated as: 
“upholding the Party’s leadership of schools … .” This 
policy document further stipulates that “important issues 
must be discussed and decided by the Party Committee, 
while ensuring that administrative leaders can fully 
exercise their authority” (The Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party & The State Council, 1993). 
Of these five systems, only System I gave the 
president complete power to exercise academic and 
administrative management.  Under this system, 
“administrative control was unblocked, the work was 
relatively efficient. Teaching and administrative work 
were carried out relatively smoothly ...” (Liu & Li, 1986, 
p.10). As some Chinese scholars have argued, in the 
period when the CCP had just taken over the government, 
this system also played a positive role in stabilizing and 
establishing normal order in institutions, and pushing 
the adjustment, reform and construction of institutions 
forward (Wang, 1986, p.18). It can be imagined that this 
system was criticised at the time because there was no 
proper supervision of the administrative management by 
the Party (Liu & Li, 1986, p.10).
This system was acceptable in the early years of the 
PRC, which was probably the only time when it could 
have been adopted. This is because the period 1949-56 
was a special stage in the history of the China when, in 
the first three years, the CCP did not have control of the 
whole country and needed to solve various problems such 
as the remaining armed force of the Nationalist Party and 
bandits, the setting up of local governments, the reform of 
economic and educational systems and the Korean War. 
Following this, the Party’s attention moved to the socialist 
transformation of industry, commerce and handicraft 
and capitalist enterprises (The Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, pp.304-305). 
Therefore, this period was in fact a transition period, when 
the socialist system had not yet been built up, and during 
which the CCP was gradually developing its organisation 
and consolidating its control over the whole country. 
The situation in this special period must be taken into 
account when considering the development of Chinese 
higher education. It must be realised that the positive 
function of System I in academic and administrative 
management was not due to the CCP’s giving up power 
in higher education, but was the result of the CCP still 
being in the process of developing its leadership in higher 
education. In other words, as some Chinese scholars 
have pointed out, in this transitional phase the Party 
organisations in universities were not yet strong enough to 
take overall leadership in the management of universities 
(Liu & Li, 1986, p.2). 
The following four systems were all under the 
leadership of the Party Committee. However these four 
systems can also be basically classified into two groups: 
Group A consisting of Systems II and IV and Group B 
consisting of Systems III and V. This classification is 
obviously characterised by the Party Committee in Group 
A taking more responsibility in management than in 
Group B. The idea of “laymen leading experts”, which 
means that the Party could supervise the educational 
experts in educational affairs, and more generally that 
the Party could lead the intellectuals in cultural and 
educational fields, was particularly a feature of System II 
(Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.228). 
Under the systems in Group A, university presidents 
were not able to play an active role in academic and 
administrative management. Therefore, from an academic 
angle, the development of higher education and the 
improvement of educational quality were all negatively 
influenced. System IV, which was adopted in an unusual 
period―the Cultural Revolution, when all the normal 
managerial systems in universities were broken―was the 
extreme example of this (Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.228). 
Under the systems in Group B, even though the basic 
structure under the leadership of the CCP did not change, 
the function of university presidents was emphasised 
more and the administrative system could operate more 
effectively. Consequently academic priorities featured 
more strongly in the development of higher education 
within Group B systems. System V, particularly, played 
a positive role in setting to rights systems that had been 
thrown into disorder during the period of the Cultural 
Revolution (Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.230).
If we put these changes into the general patterns of 
the two educational sub-models discussed above, the 
Academic Model advocates the president having more 
power in the academic and administrative management 
of the university, while the Revolutionary Model requires 
the Party Committee to take more responsibility for the 
university’s academic and administrative management 
in addition to its political and ideological work. 
Furthermore, we can see from the above that no matter 
which leadership system is in force, there are always two 
managerial lines which are represented respectively by the 
Party Committee and the president. The emphasis on one 
line or another depends upon shifts of emphasis between 
the two sub-models. Within either sub-model, however, 
the leadership of the Party Committee is the dominant 
one. This is a clear demonstration of the basic restrictions 
within the framework for higher education in China.
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4.  DUTIES OF ADMINISTRATORS IN 
UNIVERSITIES
The duties of administrators in universities demonstrate 
another aspect of the two sub-models, because the 
administrators must work to ensure that the institutions both 
keep to the socialist direction and develop academic work. 
This section looks at the specific duties of administrators―
namely what they need to do in practical terms.
My assumption, in light of all the above, is that the 
duties of administrators in Chinese universities basically 
cover two areas: ideological work and professional work 
(academic and administrative management). Evidence to 
support my assumption may be found in The Principles 
of Higher Education, where apart from specifying 
the professional duties of university presidents, also 
stipulates that, “the president must, in light of the specific 
circumstances of teaching, research, and all the other 
administrative work, assist the Party Committee in the 
ideological work of all members including academic 
staff members, students, administrators and workers in 
the institution ...” (The Central Institute of Educational 
Administration, 1986, p.88).
Further evidence may be found in the “Provisional 
Working Regulations for the President Responsibility 
System Practiced as the Experimental Internal Leading 
System in Beijing Normal University”. Four basic 
responsibilities of the president are listed. They are: 
(a) to implement the principles and policies of the 
Party, and the laws and regulations of the state; 
(b) to ensure the completion of teaching, research 
and other tasks, the continuous improvement of 
educational quality, and the improvement of academic and 
administrative work; 
(c) in the light of the specific circumstances of 
teaching, research and administrative management, to 
conduct effectively ideological work with academic staff 
members, students, administrators and workers; 
(d) to care for the welfare of all the academic staff 
members, students, administrators and workers, and make 
great efforts to improve their living conditions (Liu & Li, 
1986, p.171). 
The third of these responsibilities clearly sets out the 
president’s ideological duty. The same duty is undoubtedly 
given to lower level administrators as well.
The Pres ident  Responsib i l i ty  Sys tem,  as  an 
experimental leadership system in universities, was 
adopted in a small number of selected institutions 
following the Forum on the President Responsibility 
System held by the Propaganda Department of the Central 
Committee of the CCP and the Ministry of Education in 
November, 1984 (Liu & Li, 1986, p.8). “The Resolutions 
of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Reform of 
Education System” issued on 27th of May, 1985 also 
state: “The President Responsibility System will be step 
by step practiced in schools ...” (The Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party, 1985).
The purpose of implementing this system was to allow 
the president to “function as the chief executive officer 
in institutional management as he had done in the early 
1950s” (Du, 1992, p.26), or more specifically, to separate 
the duties of the Party Committee and the president so 
as to ensure that the president was fully responsible 
for overall teaching, research and administrative work 
in the institution and had the powers of both direction 
and policy-making in carrying out this work. As we can 
see from the Beijing Normal University’s “Provisional 
Working Regulations” however, even though the 
duties of the Party Committee and the president were 
separated, and the president had become the person who 
was fully responsible for overall teaching, research and 
administrative work, he still could not be divorced from 
ideological work. 
If we make a historical review of the CCP’s dogma in 
Mao Zedong’s works, we find that as early as 1957, Mao 
had already instructed that: “every department must take 
responsibility for ideological work. This responsibility 
should be taken by the Communist Party, the Communist 
Youth League, the responsible government departments, 
and still more by the presidents and teachers of schools” 
(Mao, 1977a, p.385). 
The methods used by administrators in undertaking 
ideological work can be seen from the following examples 
cited in The Encyclopedia of Chinese Ideological Work. 
According to the Encyclopedia, the president of Liaoning 
University invited students to be his/her Liaison Officers 
in order to keep in contact with students and understand 
and solve their ideological problems, and the president 
of the North-East Institute of Technology regularly met 
students and talked with them. Meanwhile, the president 
of Shenyang University of Technology even went to 
students’ dormitories to live and eat together with students 
―this undoubtedly included a lot of informal discussions 
and heart-to-heart talks with students (Li, Cheng & Liu, 
1990, p.1160). No specific dates for these examples are 
mentioned in the encyclopedia, however, as the article 
which contained such information was published in June 
1990, and was a report summarizing the ideological work 
that had been done in Shenyang City since the 3rd Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (1978), 
it is clear that these examples must refer to the period 
from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. 
Let us now examine why administrators in Chinese 
universities must be responsible for ideological work 
alongside administrative work. First, to carry out 
ideological work in Chinese universities is regarded as a 
basic principle. Only by following this principle can the 
institution keep its socialist character and direction. To 
quote from The Principles of Higher Education, “insisting 
on the leadership of the CCP and the ideological work 
carried out by the Party in the institutions is a basic 
principle of our socialist higher educational work” (The 
Central Institute of Educational Administration, 1986, 
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p.83). The reason for this is that ideological work in China 
simply means that one must “use Communist ideology to 
educate people”, and that such work functions to “arouse 
their revolutionary consciousness and ensure that they 
keep to the correct stand and viewpoint” (Li & Bai, 1987, 
p.215). Ideological work is therefore the main means to 
ensure the “redness” which is required by the framework. 
The book Higher Education Management gives a 
simple but even clearer statement of the function of 
ideological work: “strengthening ideological work is 
the fundamental guarantee of the university’s keeping 
its socialist character and direction” (Wang & Ying, 
1983b, p.342). Thus, as they must first ensure the 
socialist direction of the institutions, administrators in 
Chinese universities undoubtedly need to discharge their 
ideological responsibilities.
Furthermore, in China, particularly in the pre-
reform period before 1978, ideological work was also 
considered to be the most useful method for academic 
and administrative management. Under the leadership of 
the CCP, a very common understanding is that, so long as 
the people have a clear political goal, it does not matter 
what kind of professional work is done. This means that if 
people can connect their work with the CCP’s ideological 
goals, they will (according to the CCP’s logic) have 
the determination and courage to surmount difficulties. 
The following quotation from Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping shows this from the angle of students’ studies:
For students to attach primary importance to a firm and correct 
political orientation not only does not conflict with their 
studies of science and culture; on the contrary, the higher the 
political consciousness they have, the more conscientiously and 
assiduously they will study science and culture for the revolution 
(Deng, 1994b, p.104).
Thus, based on the CCP’s logic, ideological work is 
an important principle in the management of universities, 
and putting it first ensures the completion of teaching, 
research and all other professional work (Zhu, Cai & Yao, 
1983, p.47). In a more general sense, “ideological work is 
the fundamental guarantee of the completion of the basic 
tasks undertaken by the institutions of higher learning” 
(Wang & Ying, 1983b, p.343) because it is responsible not 
only for “redness”, but also for “expertise” (The Ministry 
of Education of People’s Republic of China, 1978, 
pp.401-402). All this shows that administrators in Chinese 
universities had, in fact, no choice but to undertake both 
professional and ideological duties. 
5.  THE BASIC MODEL FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN CHINA 
To summarise the above discussion, the basic model of 
Chinese higher education during the period of the 1950s 
to the 1980s had the following features:
a) an unbreakable framework, under the leadership 
of the CCP, maintaining both socialist-minded and 
professionally proficient aspects or, more simply both 
“redness” and expertise;
b) a changing proportion of academic learning from 
time to time, corresponding to changes in the political 
situation;
c) the absolute leadership of the CCP in a two line 
managerial structure, the involvement of the Party 
Committee in teaching, research and administrative work 
will vary depending on changes in the political situation;
d) the undertaking, by administrators, of both 
professional and ideological duties.
In consideration of the above, we can clearly see 
that during the period of the 1950s to the 1980s, the 
Chinese higher educational model, apart from being 
dominated by a single official ideology, can be further 
divided into two sub-models, the Academic Model and 
the Revolutionary Model. These emphasised “expertise” 
and “redness” respectively. Chinese higher education 
fluctuated between these two sub-models, or in a more 
general sense, shifted between an emphasis on less 
political ideology and more political ideology. In terms of 
practical operations, in addition to requiring ideological 
work by university administrators, the pre-reform model 
was characterised by the CCP’s involvement, in different 
degrees, in all teaching, research and administration areas. 
This made Chinese universities essentially “an arm of the 
government” (Qiang, 2012, p.46).
In order to get a more general picture of the Chinese 
higher educational model during the pre-reform era, I will 
conclude by briefly examining what changes have taken 
place in China’s higher education since the 1980s. This 
will help to put the pre-reform model in a broader context 
of China’s educational development.
Changes since the CCP’s sweeping market-oriented 
reforms of the mid-1980s have been far-reaching. In 
a general sense, the impact of the reform process on 
China’s higher education can be seen from the adoption 
of modernisation as the main goal for educational 
development (Hayhoe, 1996, p.118). In the area of 
practical management, one of the significant changes, for 
example, was that universities were allowed to “make use 
of their human capital resources and capacities in science 
and technology to generate revenue themselves” (Min, 
2004, p.70). Further to this, in the late 1990s, a policy 
orientation of the “industrialization of education” that 
aimed at “making the education sector an industry for 
moneymaking” also took shape (Ngok, 2007, p.145). 
It must be noted however that the changes brought 
about by such reforms have not touched on the ideological 
and political foundation of China’s higher education. This 
view can be supported by the fact that the experimental 
leadership system―the president responsibility system 
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of the early 1980s discussed above―was eventually 
replaced by the CCP’s traditional leadership system―the 
president responsibility system under the leadership of the 
Party Committee―in 1993. In 1998, this Party dominated 
leadership system for universities gained further 
endorsement by its recognition in the Higher Education 
Law (Item 39). The law took effect on 1st January 1999 
and is still in effect today. 
All this suggests that, since the 1990s, China’s higher 
education has, in a broad sense, followed a double-
track path of promoting both ideological principles 
and professional as well as commercial measures. In 
considering this situation, it may be argued that, in the 
midst of reforms, the Chinese government, while pushing 
the professional and commercial development of China’s 
higher education, did not want to compromise on such 
fundamental issues as the absolute leadership of the 
Party (also see Qi, 2001, p.34). The only way to achieve 
this twofold goal was then to relax the control over the 
practical operation of Chinese universities, at the same 
time as further strengthening the political framework that 
the CCP has set for higher education.
In view of the changes that have occurred since the 
1980s, we may say that the post-reform model for China’s 
higher education has functioned primarily in setting 
the political limits for the professional and commercial 
development of higher education in the course of China’s 
market-oriented reforms. In comparison with this political 
boundary-based model, the Chinese higher educational 
model during the period from the 1950s to 1980s could 
be identified as a management-oriented model. Not only 
did it set political limits but it also played an active role in 
informing the important managerial practices involved in 
the operation of Chinese universities. 
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